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T

he 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya
was a success in several important respects: it helped topple Muammar
Qaddafi’s 42-year-old regime without the deployment of ground forces, with
very low levels of collateral damage, and no NATO casualties.1 The Libyan
intervention exploited the synergy of precision airstrikes and local allies
fighting on the ground, making the deployment of foreign ground forces unnecessary. The successful overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, following a similar
strategy (but with a greater emphasis on Special Operations Forces (SOF)),
led a number of observers and analysts to herald the coming of a new way
of war, known as the “Afghan model.”2 Proponents of the model point to its
ability to achieve military success with a significantly lower cost in blood and
national treasure than previous conventional operations. It should be noted that
success here refers to operations against the opponent’s conventional forces,
not to the target state’s prospects for long-term stability. In this respect, the jury
is still out on Libya, with the government struggling to consolidate its rule.3
An important debate has emerged regarding the conditions under which the
Afghan model is effective and, therefore, the extent to which it can serve as a
template for future operations. In particular, the author and strategist Stephen
Biddle warns against learning the wrong lessons from Afghanistan, arguing that
the campaign succeeded primarily due to the parity in military skill of local US
allies and the Taliban/al Qaeda fighters.4 In his view, precision airpower and
SOF cannot compensate for a major imbalance in the skill of ground forces.5
This analysis leads Biddle to claim that, “Syria and Iran, for example, are poor
candidates for the Afghan model: Who is the trained local opposition in Syria
or Iran?”6 It appears that Libya would also be an unpromising candidate for the
Afghan model due to the absence of a trained local opposition identifiable at the
outset of the intervention. Consistent with this observation, Biddle expressed
concern about the viability of the intervention in Libya, expecting that the
outcome “could easily be a drawn-out, grinding stalemate.”7 Understanding
why the poorly skilled opposition prevailed against superior government forces
in Libya promises insight on the debate regarding the broader applicability of
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the Afghan model. This is critical not only for scholarly debates on the evolution of warfare but also for effective policymaking. As the United States tires of
fighting drawn-out, troop-intensive wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan, future
interventions are likely to mimic the Libyan experience. It is imperative that
lessons-learned from the Libyan campaign be incorporated into any informed
discussion of policy options related to the ongoing crisis in Syria.
The evidence presented in this article provides important qualifications
to the main positions in the debate. The existing analyses of the Afghan model
assume interventions will be short, which was the case in Afghanistan. The
prolonged nature of the Libyan campaign, however, points to time as a critical
element of the model. Time affected battlefield outcomes in Libya through two
mechanisms. First, it made possible the attrition of Qaddafi’s forces through
precision airpower—although, airpower did not make close ground combat irrelevant. The process of attrition over time enabled unskilled rebel forces to make
substantial progress against his ground forces. Second, time provided breathing
room for the fledging opposition force to become more skilled. The primary lesson
emerging from Libya is if an air campaign is sustained for a sufficient period of
time, depending on the interveners’ political will, it has the potential of tilting the
balance in favor of a particular side, even if they are initially outmatched.
It appears that there is a qualified positive answer to Biddle’s question,
“can the [Afghan] model trump a major skill imbalance?” Policymakers should
not expect military interventions to be easy and cheap.8 The Libyan conflict
was characterized by sustained close combat and a prolonged aerial campaign
of attrition. The political will required to execute a sustained intervention of
this sort will not always be forthcoming; indeed, the NATO coalition suffered
from divisions that threatened to undermine operations in Libya.

The Libyan Conflict
The Libyan conflict was characterized by three distinct phases. The first
phase, which began on 18 February and lasted until international intervention
on 19 March, displayed significant movement along the battlefield, but little sustained close combat. Initially, rebels in the east made rapid advances westward
along the Libyan coastline from Benghazi to Bin Jawwad, seizing strategically
important cities such as Ras Lanuf, Brega, and Ajdabiya in the east, and Misrata
and Zawiyah in the west. Rebel gains were short-lived. On 6 March the rebel
advance was halted at Bin Jawwad; Qaddafi’s forces launched a counterattack,
forcing the rebels to retreat. By the time the intervention started, Qaddafi had
successfully pushed rebel forces all the way back to Benghazi, wiping out their
fleeting territorial gains and threatening to destroy the movement.
During the second phase of the conflict, there was initially significant
movement along the front as NATO’s intervention halted Qaddafi’s progress
eastward, allowing rebels to advance as far west as Sirte. Rebel gains were again
short-lived, as Qaddafi’s forces pushed the rebels back toward Ajdabiya. By
early April the front had stabilized along the road between Brega and Ajdabiya.
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In the west, it remained stable at Misrata until mid-May, when rebels finally
gained control of the city. Rebels were not able to advance beyond Misrata.
In the third phase of the conflict, beginning in mid-July, the situation on
the ground gradually turned in favor of the rebels, culminating in the dramatic
push to Tripoli in August. An offensive was coordinated across three fronts
around Brega-Ajdabiya, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains. The residual
pockets of resistance were suppressed by mid-October with the fall of Sirte
and the killing of Qaddafi.

Assessing Competing Explanations
There are two competing schools of thought concerning the conditions
under which the Afghan Model is effective, both stemming from a broad and
longstanding debate about the role of airpower in modern warfare.9 The two
schools are the balance of technology and the balance of skill. From these two
schools we deduce observable implications, which can be evaluated against the
empirical evidence of the Libyan conflict.
The balance of technology school claims that precision airpower has an
overwhelming impact on the outcomes of war, while the skill levels of indigenous
allies and adversaries play a negligible role.10 Technology can provide modern
militaries with nearly perfect information about the location of enemy forces,
as well as the capacity to destroy them from the air. The argument suggests
the following observable implications. Airpower should destroy ground forces
from great distances, or force them to disperse and thus render them incapable
of maneuvering and massing at specific points to defeat an attacking force. This
means engagements could be relatively short and limited to nominal mop-up
operations, with “intense, prolonged combat on the ground [as] the exception
rather than the rule.”11 The balance of skill school claims that airpower is only
effective under a restrictive set of conditions. Specifically, Biddle argues that the
efficacy of precision airpower depends on the balance of skill between indigenous allies and government forces. If the adversary’s forces are poorly skilled, we
should observe local allies taking and holding ground lost by adversaries decimated by superior airpower, without sustained close combat. If the adversary’s
ground forces display a modicum of tactical proficiency (at least partial adoption
of the modern system, in Biddle’s parlance), they will be considerably more difficult to defeat—a sufficient number of concealed and entrenched defenders will
typically survive even massive amounts of precision firepower. Crucially, if local
allies lack a skill level comparable to that of their opponents, the latter should
prevail on the battlefield despite precision airpower. Conversely, if local allies are
at least as skilled as their adversaries, the former should have the upper hand with
the assistance of precision airpower.12 Biddle’s close examination of the first few
months of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan confirms his theory’s
expectations. When the Taliban deployed unskilled fighters in the early stages
of the Afghan campaign, they were promptly destroyed by precision airpower,
rendering close ground combat irrelevant. Over time, as the Taliban deployed
more effective fighters (especially al Qaeda members), precision airpower did
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not eliminate the need for close combat. Ultimately, the United States and its
local allies won individual engagements only when Northern Alliance forces
were at least as skilled as their Taliban and al Qaeda counterparts.13
The two schools of thought have different implications for the applicability of the Afghan model to future contingencies. If the balance of technology
school is correct, all but first-rate armies are potential targets for intervention.
By contrast, if the balance of skill school is correct, the list of potential targets
is limited by the requirement of a comparably skilled local opposition.

Evidence from Libya
This section assesses how closely the available evidence from Libya
corresponds to the observable implications of each model. There is little support
for the balance of technology model and evidence suggests important qualifications for the balance of skill model. Neither represents a perfect guide to
understanding the Libyan case and, thus, to learning lessons for future contingencies. Instead, the analysis suggests the rebel ground forces’ eventual success
was made possible by NATO’s gradual attrition of Qaddafi’s forces from the air.
Airpower also contributed to the rebel victory by providing breathing room that
permitted rebel skill, armaments, and coordination with NATO to improve.

Evidence for the Balance of Technology Model
The available evidence does not provide strong support to the balance
of technology argument. NATO airpower did not make close combat redundant.14 In fact, the months of the bombing campaign saw plenty of episodes of
close and prolonged combat between rebels and government forces. Only the
initial days of the intervention in eastern Libya provide evidence in line with
the balance of technology argument: on the first day of bombing (19 March),
allied planes struck Qaddafi’s forces near Benghazi, stopping their offensive
against the rebels’ de facto capital. In the following week, airpower enabled
the beleaguered rebels to push government forces 370 kilometers westward to
the outskirts of Sirte, after taking over the government-held cities of Ajdabiya,
Brega, and Ras Lanuf.15 The devastating effects of airpower on government
ground forces are well documented in newspapers’ accounts of operations in
the vicinity of Ajdabiya: “Around town are the remains of over 20 tracked
military vehicles—tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy artillery
guns. Charred turrets 20 feet away from the tanks they were once attached to
are evidence of precision strikes in recent days by British Tornadoes.”16 The
bombing destroyed much of the government armor and artillery that had been
shelling the town for the best part of the week, enabling the rebels to acquire
full control of the city by simply mopping up the remnants of Qaddafi’s forces.17
Government forces reorganized and managed to retake much of the lost
ground in the following days despite continuous NATO strikes.18 Government
forces effectively employed cover and concealment to avoid providing easy
targets to NATO aircraft. In particular, they reduced their reliance on large
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formations of heavy armored vehicles and intensified their use of small units
comprised of sport utility vehicles (SUVs) mounting light weapons, which
resembled those employed by rebels. Armor, artillery, and rocket launchers
were still used but were often concealed in populated areas and civilian buildings.19 Due to this tactical adaptation, significant numbers of Qaddafi’s forces
were able to survive NATO bombing and retained some mobility and ability
to direct substantial amounts of firepower against rebel positions. For example,
on 9 April, Qaddafi’s forces were able to engage in a battle with rebel forces in
Ajdabiya, notwithstanding NATO bombing, by advancing behind a barrage of
rocket and artillery fire.20 Similar patterns of sustained close combat characterized both the western and eastern fronts of the war in the ensuing months.

Evidence for the Balance of Skill Model
While the balance of skill model correctly predicts the pervasiveness of
close combat, the outcome of the Libyan conflict is inconsistent with a critical
prediction of the model, because less-skilled actors prevailed in the war with the
support of a technologically superior ally. We find strong evidence of a major
skill imbalance favoring Qaddafi’s forces in the initial stages of the conflict—
even though they were far from fully proficient in force employment. There is
evidence that rebel coordination with NATO aircraft, organization, and tactical
proficiency improved beginning in mid-May; in particular, rebels displayed
better adoption of cover and concealment during the month-long offensive to
retake Brega.21 This improvement can be attributed to training provided by the
interveners, but it is not clear whether this change was sufficient to close the
initial skill gap.22 In any case, this observation does not undermine the contention that the balance of skill model does not fully explain the Libyan case. If
skill levels can improve over time, then preintervention skills are not definitive
predictors of battlefield outcomes. Moreover, if NATO bombing had not prevented an imminent victory by Qaddafi’s forces at Benghazi in late March, the
increase in rebel skill would not have occurred.
In the initial stage of the conflict, the balance of skill between government and rebel ground forces favored the former. There is little evidence
to indicate the rebels, on average, displayed even basic military skills. When
rebels were confronted with superior firepower from Qaddafi’s forces, rebel
positions were often destroyed from significant distance or overrun. Massed in
the open, the rebels were vulnerable to government firepower. For example, in
Bin Jawwad in March, “rebels continued to flout standard military procedure
by massing fighters in large groups.”23 Qaddafi’s forces overran Bin Jawwad on
their advance eastward to Benghazi, “[w]ith air raids and rocket fire from an
unassailable distance . . . .The rebels had no answer to an enemy that they rarely
saw, and broke and ran under continuous barrages.”24 A rebel fighter is quoted
as saying, “[rebels] need to understand that the enemy can see us, but they’re
hidden in the desert and in houses and we can’t really see them.”25 The rebels’
failure to employ cover and concealment permitted Qaddafi’s forces to hit their
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exposed positions from a distance with mortars and rockets.26 As Qaddafi’s
forces pushed toward Benghazi, rebels were barely dug in to defend Brega,
which was supposed to be the rebels’ last line of defense: “Not a single heavygun emplacement is dug in along the 140-mile desert highway from the rebel
fighters’ new defensive line in Port Brega to Benghazi.”27 Similarly, “[w]hen
a government rocket slammed into an unfinished mosque near the rebel-held
port of Brega . . . , fighters responded not by digging trenches or attempting to camouflage anti-aircraft guns, but by chanting: ‘God is greater than the
bombs.’”28 A similar pattern was repeated in Ajdabiya, where rebels “blasted
away at [a high-flying government plane] with anti-aircraft guns, giving away
their positions . . . . [D]espite a three-week-long opportunity for preparation,
there was not a single sandbagged bunker, nor trench, nor earthen berm, nor
line of barbed wire made ready to break Colonel Gaddafi’s approach.”29 In
all three towns—Bin Jawwad, Brega, and Ajdabiya—rebels were overrun by
Qaddafi’s advancing forces.
Throughout the NATO intervention, following an initial period of
adjustment, Qaddafi’s forces employed aspects of the modern system, retaining
mobility and the ability to inflict casualties on the rebel ground forces. As the
US Navy’s Chief of Operations observed, by early April “Qaddafi’s forces had
broken into smaller and more nimble units that are not easily distinguishable from
the rebels.”30 For example, in Brega, Qaddafi concealed his forces from NATO
airstrikes by reconstituting them to resemble rebel fighters, creating “highly
mobile units [with] weapons mounted on pickup trucks so as to be less vulnerable to the air strikes.”31 Rebel fighters described a similar approach in June near
Misrata, where Qaddafi’s forces rode in “pickup trucks camouflaged to resemble
those driven by rebels. They even had the letter ‘N’ painted in sliver on the roof
to disguise themselves as friendly forces to NATO jets flying overhead.”32 At the
same time in Brega, the government continued to target rebel forces, sometimes
from great distances, while remaining dug in and concealed from NATO airstrikes. A rebel fighter in Brega described how “NATO [aircraft] were covering
us from above but Gaddafi forces fired rockets and mortars outside Brega,”33 and
rebel commanders pointed out that government “forces are dug in amid residential and commercial structures.”34 In mid-July, as rebels were breaking through
Qaddafi’s defenses at Brega, Qaddafi’s military continued to display an ability
to use concealment to shield themselves from NATO airpower, for example, by
“set[ting] fire to ditches filled with oil to create black smoke to cover their movements from NATO aircraft.”35

Explaining Rebel Success
The cumulative attrition effects of months of NATO airstrikes enabled
the ultimate success of rebel ground forces.36 The length of the intervention
also allowed for an increase in rebel skill and armaments as well as improved
coordination between rebels and NATO, which likely contributed to the rebel
victories on the ground.37 NATO bombing did not result in the immediate and
near-total destruction of enemy ground assets as predicted by the balance of
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technology model, primarily due to government forces’ rapid tactical adaptation. The bombing campaign had the important immediate effect of making it
extremely dangerous for Qaddafi’s forces to maneuver in the open or concentrate, reducing their ability to launch the large-scale offensives that had been
so successful prior to NATO’s intervention. Over time, airpower aided rebel
advances by thinning the ranks of Qaddafi’s frontline forces, as well as by
preventing the replacement and resupply of government assets.38
Throughout the months of the intervention, NATO airstrikes destroyed
government trucks, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, artillery, and command
and control assets across all major fronts. The scene described in one newspaper’s account illustrates the cumulative effect of airpower: “airstrikes blew
[Qaddafi’s vehicles] to smithereens just south of Ajdabiya, leaving [government
soldiers’] charred bodies and incinerated vehicles lying beside the carcasses of
government tanks destroyed by the allies’ aircraft two weeks earlier.”39 Between
31 March and 31 August NATO flew a total of 20,991 sorties, including 7,817
strike sorties.40 One might profess that such targets were assets abandoned by
Qaddafi’s forces after their tactical adaptation in response to NATO intervention and, therefore, attrition did not facilitate the eventual rebel victory. This
observation is unconvincing due to the fact that government forces continued
to systematically use artillery and Grad rockets against the rebels. While the
number of sorties per day was less than in Kosovo and the initial phase of
Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO precision airstrikes destroyed a significant amount of Qaddafi’s military assets. NATO reported hitting a total of 503
targets in Brega, 416 targets in Misrata, and 723 targets in Tripoli.41
The cumulative effect of the bombing of Qaddafi’s forces in and around
Brega, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains eventually enabled the rebel forces
to advance on all fronts.42 This attrition argument combines important elements
of both the balance of technology and balance of skill models. Consistent with
the former, the destructive impact of precision airpower can affect battlefield
outcomes even in the presence of a major skill gap. Consistent with the latter,
even the moderate ability to use cover and concealment by opponents prevents
airpower from having an immediate and overwhelming effect.43 Airpower did
not render ground combat irrelevant; in fact, the war was ultimately won through
a rebel ground offensive, enabled by the gradual weakening of Qaddafi’s forces
through the use of airpower.44

Conclusion
The cumulative attrition effect of precision airpower enabled a rebel
victory on the ground. The protracted nature of the intervention also provided
sufficient time for rebels to become more skilled and better armed, and to
improve their coordination with NATO. The Libyan case implies that neither
the balance of technology nor the balance of skill models provides a complete
framework for analyzing the conditions under which an airpower-based intervention might succeed. The implication is not that skill does not matter or that
technology is a more important determinant of battlefield success. Precision
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airpower does not make close combat superfluous; in fact, it is effective only
when employed in conjunction with ground forces. In cases of protracted conflict, the existence of an initial skill gap does not represent an insurmountable
obstacle for interveners.
It is crucial for policymakers to understand the generalizability of the
circumstances that led to success in Libya. A critical factor was the existence
of political will on the part of NATO and its partners to sustain a campaign
for a sufficiently long period. One should not underestimate the difficulty of
maintaining a coalition—especially when the interveners’ core security interests are not at stake. While NATO ultimately had the political will to see the
Libyan intervention through, there were moments in which the cohesion of the
coalition appeared at risk. The political repercussions of a prolonged stalemate
threatened to undermine the campaign. In addition, the intervention strained
the capabilities of alliance members, many of which encountered significant difficulties attempting to adequately resource operations. Without the US supply
of precision-guided munitions, air-to-air refueling assets, and surveillance and
intelligence capabilities, the United Kingdom and France would have been, in
all likelihood, unable to continue operations.45
The size and skill of the Libyan army and the logistical requirements
of the intervention are also critical factors to consider when assessing the case.
Given the attrition argument stated earlier, it is essential to consider the size of
the opponent’s ground forces. With sufficient time and airpower assets devoted
to the mission, any force can, in principle, be attrited, but such assets are normally only available in limited numbers in real world contingencies. Qaddafi’s
50,000-strong army represented an easier target for intervention than Iran and
Syria’s ground forces, for example, which are roughly seven and four times as
large, respectively. The Libyan army was not an absolute outlier in the developing world at large, or even in the region (e.g., Yemen’s ground forces number
60,000). Concerning skill, Qaddafi’s pervasive fear of coups led to deeper politicization of the Libyan army than other regional militaries, which negatively
impacted organizational training and skill. Nevertheless, as regional military
expert Kenneth Pollack points out, Libya’s overall military effectiveness for
most of the post-World War II period was broadly comparable to that of other
Arab states.46 On the logistical front, the Libyan intervention occurred under
favorable circumstances: the theater of operation is close to NATO’s network
of bases (for example, the Sigonella base in Sicily is only 500km from Tripoli),
while the proximity of the major ground fronts to the Mediterranean Sea
facilitated power projection from allied ships, as well as naval counterlogistics
operations. Additionally, the coalition’s campaign of attrition benefitted from
the fact that Libyan cities are separated by vast expanses of desert, permitting
NATO to impede Qaddafi’s logistical operations.
While the conditions in Libya were, in many respects, conducive to
a successful intervention, situations with broadly comparable characteristics
could emerge in the future, which makes drawing the right lessons learned
from Libya essential for policymakers. In this light, the analysis presented
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warrants some caution related to any Libyan-style intervention in Syria. The
sheer size of the Syrian ground forces would imply a longer attrition campaign
than Libya, barring en masse defection by loyal Syrian forces that, thus far,
has not occurred.47 The campaign would also be impacted by Syria’s ability to
replace destroyed assets mainly due to Syria’s more reliable allies. Additionally,
Syria’s stronger air defense would require longer and potentially costlier preparatory bombing.48 Moreover, the Syrian rebels’ limited territorial control
implies that they lack the strategic depth that proved useful for training Libyan
rebels in the Benghazi area. Finally, there is little available evidence regarding Syrian rebels’ skill level. Reports suggest that their ranks include a higher
percentage of defectors than was the case in Libya, which may imply a smaller
initial skill differential.49 It seems doubtful that this could compensate for the
order-of-magnitude force differential between the government and the rebels.50
The analysis presented should not be construed as making a normative
claim regarding the desirability of intervention in any given case. This should
depend on grand-strategic, political, and moral considerations beyond the
scope of this article. Nevertheless, responsible decisionmakers cannot ignore
considerations of military feasibility.
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